Robert Manzo reviews Anna Stenning’s latest publication Narrating the Many Autisms, exploring its position within critical autism studies.
Telling Stories About Who We Are
“Identity narratives” are a central theme in Anna Stenning’s Narrating the Many Autisms. These are the stories we individually construct, tell, and retell about who we are. Through these stories, even if only implicitly and indirectly, we establish what counts as being human and what it means to have a rich, meaningful subjective experience of the world. Stenning argues that Autistic people’s “narrative agency,” “understood here as their presumed capacity and authority to make sense of themselves in relation to others through time,” has been inhibited for a long time by pathologizing “master narratives” about Autism (Stenning, p. 2).
Master narratives cast Autistic people as faulty interpreters of experience who are improperly oriented to social and material worlds. In contrast, autistic-authored ‘counterstories’, according to Stenning, are reliable accounts of a different but no less valid orientation. She finds that—in contrast to the modern Western ideal of a “human self” that is defined by language-use and anthropocentric consciousness- Autistics tend to be equally, if not more, attuned to non-linguistic, sensory experiences and to an ecological context of which humankind is only a part (Stenning, p. 2). Thus, Autistic identity narratives reveal a unique conception of self, one that finds little recognition or legitimacy in a prevailing politics and culture that roots its conception of self in a linguistic/symbolic capacity and a predominantly human-oriented consciousness.
An equally important key concept in the book is “sensory subjectivity” (Stenning, p. 3). Describing “a sensory orientation to the world,” the term “provides a more inclusive framework from which to consider ‘lived experience’ than symbolic, structural or neurological models [of subjectivity]” (Stenning p. 3; p. 9). With this vocabulary, across five chapters Stenning explores “the moral texture of Autistic lives” as told in counterstories, thus affirming Autistics’ narrative agency, bringing into focus their sensory subjectivities, and, finally, arguing for the value of the contributions to shared social and political worlds that Autistics already make and could yet make, in the future, should they be afforded greater recognition of their personhood (Stenning, p .viii; p. 1; p. 9).
Self, Agency, and Recognition of Personhood
Chapter One considers how Autistic people, as subjects and agents in the world, are widely misrecognized or not recognized at all, due to the modern, Western understanding of “selves” as primarily “symbolic, structural, or neurological” subjects. Such an understanding devalues experiences of the body that are not reducible to brain-centered descriptions. Conversely, it overvalues human symbolic capacities above “iconic and indexical modes of association and interaction” which for many Autistics are stronger (Stenning, p. 2). If “the prevailing cultural conditions for our appearance in the shared world” require symbolic communication and a brain-based self-conception, then Autistic people will struggle to be perceived by others; they will struggle to attain what “the political philosopher Sarah Lucus calls “ontological agency”: “confidence that one will appear in the world and be recognized by others as a unique being” (Stenning, p. 45).
Without such basic recognition, Stenning argues, one can hardly go on to achieve narrative or political agency, since identity-construction (through narratives) and political participation (through political systems) both depend on recognition by others. As an example, Stenning refers to Anand Prahlad’s 2017 book The Secret Life of a Black Aspie, in which Prahlad describes how other people struggle to reconcile different aspects of his identity. He cannot be open about who he is, as “his interactions are shaped by narratives about race, which constrain his ability to disclose his Autism. Autism is associated with childhood, whiteness and tragedy (Stenning). Since he can ‘hold a job’, he is further barred from disclosing his Autism even in white spaces where he might otherwise be able to” (Stenning, p. 28). To be adult, employed, black, Autistic, and not living out a “tragedy” is hardly conceivable in a culture where “master narratives” (about race, age, Autism, et.c) render such a combination unimaginable.
Master Narratives and Counterstories
Chapter Two confronts the ways in which “master narratives” about Autism “typically construe Autistic mindedness as an impaired subjectivity,” thus perpetuating mis- or non-recognition (Stenning, p. 49). Examples of master narratives include “stories about children who don’t engage in imaginative play” and “stories about children who see other people as objects” (Stenning, p. 58-59). Stenning notes how master narratives tend to prioritize being over doing, and individual features over relational contexts, so that master narratives give little attention to the efforts made (or not) by non-Autistic children and professionals to adjust their communication or action in a mutually recognitive response to Autistic partners in play, conversation, or other interactions (Stenning, p. 70-71). In one powerful statement, Stenning points out that an Autistic person’s not following “normative social conventions” does not entail, as master narratives typically assume, an “absent social motivation” (Stenning, p. 79). To pathologize an Autistic person who does not follow “normative social conventions” is to implicitly conceive of communication and interaction as one-sided rather than dialogical, leading to the erroneous conclusion that ‘Autistic mindedness’ is “an impaired subjectivity”, a fault in one person’s being rather than a fault in doing between two people (Stenning, p. 49; p. 79).
In Chapter Three, Stenning characterizes Autistic-authored narratives as “counterstories” (i.e., counter to master narratives), and, in a validation of sensory subjectivity, she intends to “argue that narrative expressions of sensory experiences may serve as the basis of new forms of interpersonal relations” (Stenning, p. 93). While master narratives fault Autistic people for being apparently averse or unable to socialize with others, counterstories show that Autistic people do try to facilitate “shared worlds” and “mutual recognition” but through “locating, sharing, and reproducing rhythms and patterns within the flow of sensory experiences” rather than through language and symbolism (Stenning, p. 97). This, then, is a way of socializing, of participating in “shared worlds” that is not based in symbolism and abstract concepts.
Relating to Life Beyond the Human
Rowell Heria
In Chapter Four, Stenning goes beyond talking about non-normative forms of sociality between humans, and she addresses Autistic people’s relations with “the non-human world” and a wider ecological context (Stenning, p. 134). Drawing on the work of anthropologist Eduardo Kohn, Stenning argues that a “sensory subjectivity” is attuned to “forms of relation are semiotic but not necessarily symbolic,” such as the forms of relation commonly found among non-human animals as well as plants, where “[i]ndexical and iconic communication can produce… feelings of connection, but it is not a connection that is ultimately within the control of the human” (Stenning, p. 135; p. 43). Autistic narrator Chris Packham, for example, shows incredible communicational competence and “mutual recognition” of another when, in a memory from his childhood, he notices a bird in the garden and “creates a sonic icon of the bird’s call by whistling” and “recognize[s] an iconic similarity between his own exploration of the garden environment and the bird’s activities” (Stenning, p. 144).
By culturally over-valuing the symbolic, we devalue and sometimes fail to perceive the modes of communication to which sensory subjectivities are more attuned. Ultimately, Stenning suggests that, on the one hand, we should not overly identify “humanity” with symbolic capacities alone and that, on the other hand, we should not seek to assert or reify a deep divide between human and other forms of life. Autistics tend to embrace the other-than-symbolic and the other-than-human in a way that is actually exemplary, developing to a high degree the sense of relationality that it is possible for all humans to cultivate.
Mutual Recognition, World-Building, and an Inclusive Politics
In Chapter Five, Stenning reiterates the importance of narrative agency to the activity of collective “world-building.” Just, ethical action requires humans’ “mutual recognition” of one another’s uniqueness, without which there will always be classes of “others” whose needs and wants will remain addressed by prevailing social and political practices (Stenning, p. 93, p. 163). If politics is “acting in a shared world” and if “[o]ur ability to relate to others as selves is rooted in a narrative capacity,” then collective “world-building” through politics requires us to attend to one another’s stories (Stenning, p. 163). Sharing stories, and engaging in genuinely collaborative action across lines of cultural and cognitive difference, is often hindered by standard ways of organizing political institutions and organizations, but could be remedied by the practice of “commoning”:
“[a] practice of collaborating and sharing resources, labor, and knowledge to support the well-being of individuals, communities, and environments. … This contrasts with… the assumption that cooperation can only occur through hierarchical forms of governance and state intervention, based on abstract symbolic roles” (Stenning, p. 163-164).
Based on her readings of counterstories, Stenning finds that Autistics are rarely motivated to take up “symbolic roles” within social groups, corporations, or political organizations. Instead, Autistics tend to perform well within horizontal structures in which direct sharing is encouraged, rather than indirect information-sharing through vertical rank structures. The challenge, then, for workplaces, governments, and communities that want to truly include—and benefit from the talents of—Autistic people is to transition from vertical to horizontal organizational structures and from valuing “symbolic roles” to valuing unique contributions.
The Bigger Picture: A Movement Toward Alternatives to Pathologization
Narrating the Many Autisms is a reflective, careful investigation of Autism, identity, and humanity, one that draws primarily on the fields of critical psychology and anthropology. Additionally, in its elaboration of “sensory subjectivity” as a framework for understanding lived experience, the book reminded me of Susan Buck-Morss’s 1992 article “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics.” There, Buck-Morss conceptualizes the brain as “not an isolable anatomical body, but part of a system that passes through the person and her or his (culturally specific, historically transient) environment,” forming a “sensory circuit” inclusive of body and environment (Buck-Morss, p. 12). For both Buck-Morss and Stenning, subjectivity is profoundly sensory, rather than only/primarily symbolic, in its constitution. The surface of the body—the skin and other sensory-receptor organs—is not subordinate or peripheral to the brain in constituting subjectivity. Buck-Morss suggests that in modern (post-)industrial societies, with their harsh, anaesthetizing human-built environments, humans have come to disavow their bodies’ location within the sensory circuit, preferring instead to define humanity and personhood in terms of abstract cognition alone. When regarded in historical context, then, perhaps one distinction of Autistic subjectivity is its resistance to modern anaestheticization.
Overall, Stenning’s book is an original contribution to an emerging Autistic-authored literature that advances non-pathologizing models for interpreting Autism. Within this emerging historical shift, perhaps Stenning’s strongest contribution is her positive politics: her belief in a society in which sensory subjectivities are recognized and duly considered in our shared, political decision-making processes. Scholars and service providers interested in constructive alternatives to the medical model of difference/disability would improve their practice immensely by absorbing and building on the analyses in Stenning’s book.
About the Author
Robert Manzo (he/him/his) is an Autistic PhD student and aspiring Disability Studies researcher based in the School of Information and Library Science at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. In the course of his doctoral career, he has written several unpublished essays on Autism, subjectivity, and knowledge production. In the past two years, he has focused on developing and teaching (twice so far) an original graduate-level course on Critical Disability Studies. His other interests include music composition, short story writing, hermeneutical theory, and literary history (particularly Mikhail Bakhtin and, unrelatedly, the 1910s-20s literary group that included Katherine Mansfield and D.H. Lawrence). He has not yet figured out how social media works, despite being in his thirties, but he can be contacted at rorobe15@email.unc.edu.
References
Buck-Morss, Susan. “Aesthetics and Anesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered.” October 62 (1992): 3-41.
Prahlad, Anand (2017). The Secret Life of a Black Aspie. University of Chicago Press.
Stenning, Anna. Narrating the Many Autisms: Identity, Agency, Mattering. New York: Routledge, 2024. Stenning’s text is open access and can be read for free via the Routledge website.
